

# DDOS ATTACKS & COLLATERAL DAMAGE WHAT CAN WE DO TO AVOID IT?

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OCTOBER 2016

## AGENDA


- DDOS ATTACKS - WHAT ? HOW ? WHO ?
- THE IMPACT (SIZE AND TYPES)
- THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE PROBLEM
- GLOBAL INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICES
- HOW CAN TATA COMMUNICATIONS HELP

# DDOS ATTACKS - WHAT? HOW? WHO?

Sourced from DISTRIBUTED BOTNETS but triggered by C&C Servers.


Attempt to consume FINITE resources, exploit design WEAKNESS, saturate infrastructure CAPACITY

Affects service AVAILABILITY, thereby Denial of Service to legitimate user traffic




# DDoS ATTACK TRENDS


SURVEY PEAK ATTACK SIZE YEAR OVER YEAR




INDUSTRIES AFFECTED



TOP SOURCES OF DDOS ATTACKS




DDOS ATTACKS




# DDOS ATTACKS CLASSIFICATIONS

DDOS ATTACK VECTORS ARE MAINLY CLASSIFIED AS VOLUMETRIC ATTACKS, TCP EXHAUSTION ATTACKS, AND APPLICATION LAYER ATTACKS.




- Consumes the connection state tables in devices like load-balancers, firewalls and application servers.
- High capacity devices capable of maintaining state on millions of connections can be taken down by these attacks
- ‘TCP SYN flood’ attack is a common example.

# DDOS ATTACKS CLASSIFICATIONS



- Exploits stateless behavior of UDP protocol
- UDP based floods from spoofed IPs generates heavy bps/pps traffic volume
- Takes out Infra capacity - routers, switches, servers
- ‘Ping flood’, ‘Smurf attack’, ‘UDP flood’ etc. are volumetric in nature


# DDOS ATTACKS CLASSIFICATIONS



- Attacks which target an application or service at Layer-7
- Disguised to look like legitimate traffic, except it targets specific applications
- ‘Slow Loris’ is an attack which takes down a server by keeping open as many connections to the target as possible using http GET/POST floods

# DDOS ATTACKS CLASSIFICATIONS

## REFLECTION AND AMPLIFICATION




- Many protocols can be leveraged by attackers
- DNS, NTP, SSDP, CHARGEN, SNMP are commonly observed
- Amplification factors makes it lethal

| Protocol | Ports      | Amplification factor |
|----------|------------|----------------------|
| NTP      | UDP / 123  | 600x                 |
| DNS      | UDP / 53   | 160x                 |
| SSDP     | UDP / 1900 | 30x                  |
| CHARGEN  | UDP / 19   | 18x                  |
| SNMP     | UDP / 161  | 800x                 |



# DDOS ATTACKS - COLLATERAL VICTIMS



## WHAT MAKES DDOS ATTACKS POSSIBLE?

- Failure to deploy network ingress filtering at the very edge - BCP 38, for anti-spoofing using ACLs or uRPF or IP Source verify
- Abusable services in the open Internet running on servers, home CPE devices, routers, and other IoT devices
- Low difficulty of execution of such attacks; readily available attack tools
- Network operators not utilizing the best practices
- Failure to deploy DDOS attack detection, response and mitigation tools

# BEST PRACTICES FOR NETWORK OPERATORS

## DON'T BE A PART OF THE PROBLEM




- Deploy anti-spoofing at network edge
- Don't be a spoofing-friendly network - or you will soon be blocked!
- Proactively scan for and fix abusable services
  - Block them if necessary to take them offline
- Check [www.openntpproject.org](http://www.openntpproject.org) and its equivalents to see if abusable services have been identified on your network and take suitable action
- Do not accept collateral damage - have a process and system in place

# BUILD AN EFFECTIVE DDoS DETECTION AND MITIGATION SOLUTION

## Regional DDoS defense layer

Deploying a local DDoS attack defense solution helps in mitigating regional attacks without having to direct all local and regional attack traffic to global DDoS defense layer.

- A deployment of DDoS attack detection and mitigation systems within network helps to defend attacks sourced from the region effectively.
- Regional traffic is scrubbed for DDoS attacks with no impact on network latency.
- Ideal Mitigation capacity = Total Ingress network bandwidth
- Minimum mitigation capacity = max attack size in the region, if the network transport has room to carry
- You can only Mitigate what you can carry on your network
- subscribe to Carrier-based cloud mitigation services



## WHAT WORKS WELL?

| Attack type                     | Impact on Network / DC Service Provider  | Impact on content owner  | Effective Mitigation technique   |
|---------------------------------|--|--|--|
| <b>TCP State exhaustion</b>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited or Nil</li> </ul>   | <b>High</b> - Impacts all statefull devices in transit                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arrested by SP Cloud Mitigation, if detected</li> <li>On-premise CPE solutions are proactive</li> </ul>                 |
| <b>Volumetric</b>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tier-1 operator - Nil or limited impact on rare occasions</li> <li>Other DC and Tier-2/3 operators - Causes bandwidth choke-points based on capacity; leading to collateral damage</li> </ul> | <b>High</b> - Impact at the network edge to server edge - weakest link fails | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SP Cloud mitigation</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Application layer</b>        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tier-1/2/3 operator - Limited or Nil impact</li> <li>DC Service provider services such as IaaS are impacted; design should adapt protection against noisy-neighbors (tenants)</li> </ul>      | <b>High</b> - weakest node breaks-down                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On-premise CPE solutions are effective</li> <li>Basic attacks are defended by SP Cloud mitigation techniques</li> </ul> |
| <b>Reflective Amplification</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tier-1 operator - Nil or limited impact on rare occasions</li> <li>Other DC and Tier-2/3 operators - Causes bandwidth choke-points based on capacity; leading to collateral damage</li> </ul> | <b>High</b> - Impact at the network edge to server edge - weakest link fails | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SP Cloud mitigation</li> </ul>  |

**TATA** COMMUNICATIONS




# HOW CAN TATA COMMUNICATIONS HELP?




# TATA COMMUNICATIONS' TIER 1 IP NETWORK POWERS INTEGRATED DDOS DETECTION AND MITIGATION SERVICES

- 24% of the world's Internet routes are on our network
- Only Tier 1 Provider to feature in the Top 5 in 5 continents
- 99.7% of the world's GDP can be reached using the Tata Communications' Global Network



# DDOS SCRUBBING FARM

## GLOBAL DEPLOYMENT FOOTPRINT





# WHAT MAKES TATA COMMUNICATIONS DIFFERENT

PROTECTING CUSTOMERS FROM DDOS ATTACKS FOR LAST 10 YEARS

## EFFECTIVE PROTECTION INGREDIENTS



Tier 1 Service Provider  
-  
we peer with  
EVERYONE

Other Service  
Providers accept new  
routing info from us  
automatically



Huge backbone  
capacity - we can  
absorb DDoS attacks  
easily

The traffic is minor in  
comparison to the  
normal traffic we  
route



DDoS mitigation  
capabilities are already  
deployed in our network

Customers don't have  
to wait for us to  
deploy new capacity -  
it's already there



We can deliver  
mitigation services to  
ANYONE, ANYWHERE

No need to take  
connectivity services  
from Tata



# THANK YOU

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## WHY DO TRADITIONAL TOOLKITS FAIL TO PROTECT FROM DDoS ATTACKS?

- Traditional network protection devices like firewall and IPS/ IDS are in-line, stateful devices and are vulnerable to state exhaustion ddoS attacks.
- Firewall /ips/ ids are the first to be affected by large flood or connection attacks and are the 'weakest link in the chain'
- These network protection devices use signature - based analysis or URL blacklisting to detect and prevent threats and hence fail to detect the ddoS attacks
- Attacks like TCP SYN flood, targets webservers with partial open TCP connections choking the bandwidth and forbid legitimate customers to access the requested service

